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Abstract 
Recent literature about gravity models points out the importance of institutional frictions in 
the international market of agricultural products beyond the traditional economics variables as 
transport costs reducing the mass of trade in bilateral relationships. In particular, previous 
contributions stress that harmonization of food standards could decrease transaction costs in 
trading relationships by stimulating international market. In a previous work we hypothesized 
that the acknowledgment of equivalence in organic standards may represent a reliable signal 
of affinity in bilateral relationships which may be useful to identify areas in which transaction 
costs for both conventional and organic standards are lower. 
This  article  represents  a  step  forward,  since  it  assumes  that  the  acknowledgment  of 
equivalence in identifying areas with lower transaction costs in trading relationships for the 
whole produce could be a strong assumption that may be relaxed through the hypothesis that 
affinity in market exchange could be simply signaled by the presence of organic standards for 
the involved countries. Therefore, in our analysis we test if countries setting specific rules for 
organic  standards  are  more  “affine”  in  trading  relationships  because  of  a  low  common 
cultural, law and political distance but also if differences in organic standards themselves can 
be useful to differentiate the level of affinity among regions. Interesting insights for policy 
makers about the identification of relevant variables for international business arise from an 
econometric analysis. 
 
JEL codes: Q11, Q 13 
 
Keywords:  Gravity  models,  organic  standards,  transaction  costs,  international  market, 
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Introduction 
International  business  relationships  are  strongly  affected  by  the  traditional  variables 
expressing demand and supply factors such as in the perfect competition theory (preferences, 
on  the  consumer  side  and  technology  in  the  supply  side)  and  by  those  variables  which 
typically represent frictions in the free exchange of goods such as the transaction costs. 
Whereas  models  explaining  international  business  relationships  easily  introduce  economic 
variables such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and GDP per capita to identify the main 
factors influencing import and export exchanges, the most challenging issue is to correctly 
consider variables describing transaction costs. Frictions in the international business often 
depend on factors which are hardly measurable such as the differences in language, religion 
or political systems. An article by Dow and Karunaratna (2006) uses the Hofstede Index as 
continuous  variable  to  capture  the  cultural  distance  among  countries  and  its  impact  on 
business.  Tadesse  and  White  (2008)  interpret  cultural  distance  as  the  contrast  between 
societies showing deference to authority and interest to the Survival values such as the hard 
work and societies characterized by individualism and a greater attention paid attributed to the 
quality of life. 
Even  more  difficult  it  is  the  attempt  to  find  and  measure  transaction  costs  in  specific 
economic sectors, such as the agricultural one. The contribution from Henry de Frahan and 
Vancauteren  (2006)  specifically  recognizes  differences  in  food  standards  as  barriers  in 
international business. In a forthcoming paper (Canavari and Cantore 2008) we implemented 
an econometric analysis to test if countries granting equivalence in organic standards and 
privileged import procedures to partners are more likely to develop an international business 
concerning  conventional  products.  In  other  words,  we  hypothesized  that  only  when  trust 
relationships  arise  in  the  market  about  conventional  food,  countries  would  stipulate  
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agreements about the higher quality products such as the organic ones. The acknowledgement 
of  equivalence  of  the  organic  certification  would  represent  a  “signal”  of  affinity  in 
international bilateral trading relationships. The findings actually support this hypothesis. 
This article represents a step forward. We test the assumption that the acknowledgment of 
equivalence to identify low transaction costs areas is a restrictive one and that the simple 
presence of implemented rules for organic standards could be a valid signal to find bilateral 
business  exchanges  characterized  by  lower  transaction  costs  and  trust  relationships.  As 
outlined by a recent IFOAM publication (Willer and Yussefi 2004), in 2003 only 39 countries 
had a regulation in place about organic standards
1. This means that in 2003 in only about 25% 
of the world countries specific organic standards were available. Therefore, our assumption is 
that  the  presence  of  organic  standards  is  a  signal  of  cultural  affinity  and  among  these 
countries it is more likely to establish fruitful trading, counting on a lower level of frictions. 
Moreover,  we  test  the  assumption  that  though  countries  showing  organic  standards  are 
characterized by lower transaction costs and higher mass of trading between them, the extent 
to  which  transaction  costs  decrease  also  depend  on  the  level  of  “similarity”  between 
international organic standards.  In other words, our hypothesis is that countries providing 
organic standards are more “affine” in bilateral trading rather than countries that are late in 
setting  regulations  for  organic  food.  Among  countries  that  regulated  the  organic  sector, 
however, the most “affine” ones are the countries in which standards are more similar. 
We  develop  our  analysis  applying  gravity  models,  which  represent  a  fruitful  strand  of 
research. Since the first attempts (Tinbergen 1962; Pöyhönen 1963) data strongly fitted the 
model assumptions framework. The basic idea behind the gravity model is that the flow of 
bilateral  trading  is  positively  related  to  economic  variables  such  as  GDP  (expressing  the 
capacity of economies to produce or absorb production) and GDP per capita (expressing the 
                                                            
1  In the Appendix 1 a list of the countries with a certification system is provided.  
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capacity to pay for goods) and negatively related to the distance representing transport costs. 
A wide literature developed to validate the model by a theoretical approach (Bergstand 1985; 
Anderson and Wincoop 2003) or by empirical models in order to enrich the original model set 
up (Frankel and Rose 2002). 
A  more  restricted  literature  specifically  focuses  on  the  agricultural  sector  (Ševela  2002; 
Dascal, Mattas, and Tzouvelekas 2002; Atici and Guloglu 2006) and as we said the attempts 
to investigate institutional factors like food regulations and standards are even more sporadic 
(Nardella  and  Boccaletti  2006;  Disdier,  Fontagne,  and  Mimouni  2008).  This  is  another 
relevant reason for which we deem our article may represent an original contribution in this 
field of literature. 
The article is organized as follows. First we present the methodological framework about the 
model and variables construction. Then we describe the data and present the results. Finally 
we draw some conclusions. 
Model set up 
To run our econometric analysis we start from the basic gravity model (BGM) as found in 
most part of the previous published literature as follows: 
1)  1 2 3 log log( * ) log(( / )*( / )) log( ) ij i j i i j j ij ij V Y Y Y L Y L D α β β β ε = + + + +  
where  V = total import/export flow of agricultural products for the generic countries i and j, 
where i is Italy and j is a partner country,  
  Y = level of GDP,  
  L = population 
  Y/L = GDP per capita 
  D = distance  
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Therefore, in this model we include as explanatory variables only GDP, GDP per capita, both 
expressed as the interaction between Italy and the corresponding commercial partner, and the 
geographical distance. 
Then we enrich our model by including two dummy variables which are able to identify those 
countries implying low transaction costs with Italy about trading relationships. In order to 
reach our aim we implement a first modified gravity model (MGM1) as follows: 
2)  1 2 3 4 5 log log( * ) log(( / )*( / )) log( ) ij i j i i j j ij ij V Y Y Y L Y L D DEU DCERT α β β β β β ε = + + + + + +  
where  DEU = binary variable representing the inclusion of Italy’s trading partners in the 
European Union,  
  DCERT = binary variable representing all those extra-European countries providing 
an organic certification system and having organic regulation in place. 
The thought behind the variable DEU is that if a country is included in the European Union, 
business relationships with Italy are easier because of a common culture, laws and political 
institutions. 
The  variable  DCERT  represents  the  important  difference  with  the  model  framework 
developed in Canavari and Cantore (2008), which included a binary variable representing 
only the extra-European countries enjoying privileged export procedures of organic products 
to Italy through equivalence agreements. 
The main idea concerning the variable DCERT is that if countries share a common culture 
about food quality and they feel to devote specific rules to regulate organic standards are 
more likely to be “affine” also in business relationships concerning conventional food.  
Finally we estimate a second extended gravity model by modifying the design of the variable 
DCERT  and  by  transforming  it  from  a  categorical  into  a  continuous  variable  labelled  as 
L_CERT. To reach our aim we set up a second version of the MGM model (MGM2) as 
follows:  
   
5 
3)  1 2 3 4 5 log log( * ) log(( / )*( / )) log( ) log( * _ ) ij i j i i j j ij ij V Y Y Y L Y L D DEU DCERT HARM INDEX α β β β β β ε = + + + + + +  
The variable HARM_INDEX is a harmonization index and it represents the extent to which 
certification  systems  are  “similar”.  The  underlying  concept  is  that  countries  with  a  solid 
organic certification system are more likely to set up more intense business relationships of 
conventional and organic food and that among those countries the widest trading exchanges 
will be developed by those countries showing more “similar” organic standards. 
To estimate the parameters we used the transformed linear model described in 3) as follows 
4)  1 2 3 4 5 _ _ _ ij LTRADE LPROD Y LPROD YPC LDIST DEU L CERT α β β β β β ε = + + + + + +   
Where  LTRADE = logVij;   
  C = constant term;  
  LPROD_Y = log(Yi*Yj);  
  LPROD_YPC = log((Yi/Li)*(Yj/Lj)); 
  LDIST=log(Di,j); 
  L_CERT=log(DCERT*HARM_INDEX). 
In the next section we briefly describe the dataset and our strategy for data collection. 
Data 
The analyses are driven by a 65 cross country (2003) and a balanced panel (period 1996 – 
2003) dataset.  The dataset used in this article is a  restricted sample  of the one used by 
Canavari and Cantore (2008). A list of our dataset countries is provided in the Appendix 2.  
Data about the monetary value of the volume of bilateral trading for the whole agricultural 
produce are taken from the FAOSTAT (www.fao.org) core dataset, which includes a set of 
the most important agricultural products expressed in thousands of USD and which does not 
distinguish between organic and non organic food.  The FAOSTAT Core data is a coherent, 
consistent data set for all countries and for all years (from 1990 onwards) for commodities in  
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their primary equivalent.  Panel data are expressed in real terms on the basis of data about 
national price deflators from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  GDP and population 
data are taken form the IMF data Set (www.imf.org).  Data about physical distance come 
from the webpage of Andrew Rose (http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm).   
Finally,  the  data  regarding  the  harmonization  index  are  derived  from  a  survey  among 
practitioners multidimensional scaling technique. The most challenging theoretical problem in 
this analysis is to rationalize the idea of similarity. In order to express a numerical value 
accounting for similarity we adopted a multidimensional scaling (MDS) technique. We rely 
upon the evaluations of a set of 12 experts selected among the most important third party 
certification bodies in Italy. We interviewed practitioners with managerial and/or technical 
expertise  and  we  asked  them  to  assess  the  degree  of  similarity  of  international  organic 
standards  by  pair  wise  comparisons,  considering  the  organic  certification  systems  and 
regulations in force in the European Union, Canada, Switzerland, USA, and Japan.  This 
technique allowed us creating a plot (Figure 1), in which the distance among the certification 
systems  represents  the  level  of  dissimilarity  perceived  by  the  interviewees.  The  level  of 
discrepancies between the Euclidean distances and dissimilarity in interviews are represented 
by  an  appropriate  STRESS  index.  Therefore,  by  this  MDS  technique  we  obtained  a 
measurement of “dissimilarity” of organic certification systems with European Union (and 
Italy) by imposing the generation of a bi-dimensional plot of coordinates.   
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Figure 1.  Similarity in international organic standards by the multidimensional scaling technique. 
 
Source: Our elaboration 
To yield an index of similarity we calculated the inverse of the dissimilarity index in order to 
obtain a “similarity” index. Finally we standardized the values of the “similarity” index in 
order to obtain our harmonization index (HARM_INDEX) in a [1, e] range by attaching the 
value e to the most “similar” certification system with European Union and consequently 
Italy
2. 
                                                            
2  The coefficient associated to the harmonisation index shows a twofold interpretation. It represents elasticity 
(% variation of trade flows deriving from % variations of the harmonisation index) or semi-elasticity (% 
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Results  
Results of the BGM model by a cross section analysis in 2003 (table 1) are perfectly in line 
with those found by Canavari and Cantore (2008) with a larger data set (130 countries) and 
confirm the signs that we expect from a basic gravity model set up (positive sign for GDP and 
negative sign for distance) within a 5% significance level. We also find a not significant sign 
for  GDP  per  capita  but  this  finding  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  food  products  are 
scarcely elastic to income. 
Table 1. OLS. Cross country analysis (65 countries). 2003. BGM model. 
Dependent variable: LTRADE 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard error  t-statistics  Prob. 
C  -16.57923  5.600730  -2.960190  0.0044*** 
LPROD_Y  0.766437  0.103096  7.434222  0.0000*** 
LPROD_YPC         0.082451  0.131502  0.626990  0.5330 
LDIST  -1.005470  0.258487  -3.889831  0.0003*** 
Adjusted R
2 = 0.73 
   
Now we analyze the results arising from the MGM1 model including dummy variables (table 
2). Coefficients associated to both the binary variables DEU and DCERT are significant and 
show a positive sign.  
Table 2. OLS. White Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance. Cross country 
analysis (65 countries). 2003. MGM1 model. 
Dependent variable: LTRADE 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard error  t-statistics  Prob. 
C  -10.13880  5.607726  -1.808005  0.0757* 
LPROD_Y  0.625858  0.096640  6.476205  0.0000*** 
LPROD_YPC  -0.010307  0.130827  -0.078787  0.9375 
LDIST  -0.730074  0.314992  -2.317753  0.0239** 
DEU  1.772256  0.681580  2.600217  0.0118** 
DCERT  1.452879  0.614555  2.364115  0.0214** 
Adjusted R
2 = 0.74 
Note:  White test for OLS standard estimation (F-test: 0.00184). 
The finding about the DEU variable is easily interpretable: more intense trading relationships 
of  agricultural  produce  with  Italy  are  developed  with  countries  included  in  the  European 
Union  because  of  common  habits,  culture  and  laws.  More  interestingly  (with  a  White 
heteroscedasticity correction implemented after the diagnostics arising from the usual White  
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test) we find a significant and positive value also for the coefficient associated to the DCERT 
variable. 
The interesting insight coming from the estimation showed in the table 2 is that countries 
expressing regulation for organic products show more intense trading relationships with Italy. 
Those  countries  are  therefore  characterized  by  a  higher  level  of  “affinity”  in  business 
relationships which is reflected in a wider exchange of conventional and organic products. 
The problem now is to verify if among the countries with great similarity in organic standards 
develop higher level of commerce mass. Results of the table 3 show that this hypothesis is 
confirmed by the empirical analysis of data. The variable L_CERT is significant and with a 
positive sign. The interpretation of this finding is that countries showing “similar” organic 
standards  if  compared  to  those  set  by  Italy  develop  more  intense  bilateral  trading 
relationships. Affinity in organic standards represents affinity in culture, trust and habits in 
business  relationships  involving  also  the  market  of  conventional  food.  Harmonization  of 
organic standards represents therefore a signal of affinity concerning the whole food market. 
Table 3. OLS. White Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance. Cross country 
analysis (65 countries). 2003. MGM2 model. 
Dependent variable: LTRADE 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard error  t-statistics  Prob. 
C  -11.44038  5.121371  -2.233850  0.0293** 
LPROD_Y  0.645983  0.090618  7.128675  0.0000*** 
LPROD_YPC  -0.009102  0.132011  -0.068951  0.9453 
LDIST  -0.697667  0.320593  -2.176172  0.0336** 
DEU  1.727971  0.692410  2.495591  0.0154** 
L_CERT  1.584261  0.629280  2.517577  0.0146** 
Adjusted R
2 = 0.75 
Note:  White test for OLS standard estimation (F-test: 0.00404). 
Interestingly, results are robust across time. By estimating equation 4) with a panel approach 
in the lapse of time 1996-2003 and after the usual redundant fixed effects test and Hausman 
test to set the best model specification we find results which substantially confirm our cross- 
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country estimations
3. An appropriate F-test applied to DEU and L_CERT confirms that those 
variables  enrich  the  traditional  gravity  model  and  are  not  redundant  (table  4).  The  usual 
adjusted R
2 index shows a good model performance. 
Table 4. Panel analysis (65 countries. Time period: 1996-2003). White cross-section standard errors and 
covariance 1996-2003. Random time period effects. MGM2 model. 
Dependent variable: LTRADE. 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard error  t-statistics  Prob. 
C  -12.84166  1.236782  -10.38312  0.0000*** 
LPROD_Y  0.723289  0.035206  20.54424  0.0000*** 
LPROD_YPC  -0.005606  0.034689  -0.161597  0.8717 
LDIST  -1.013797  0.077308  -13.11371  0.0000*** 
DEU  0.916221  0.153618  5.964277  0.0000*** 
L_CERT  0.802496  0.233336  3.439235  0.0006*** 
Adjusted R
2 = 0.76 
Note:  Redundant fixed effects test (F-test: 0.0001); Hausman test for random effects (F-test: 1.0000). Redundant variables 
test on the DEU and L_CERT variables (F-test: 0.00085) 
Conclusions 
In this article we focused on institutional factors related to the international marketing of 
agricultural produce. We identified the main variables which can affect bilateral trade flows. 
Not surprisingly, we find that results obtained using the traditional gravity model are quite 
robust for Italy's agricultural trade. The most interesting part of our contribution is the attempt 
to  interpret  institutional  factors  determining  frictions  in  commercial  exchange  among 
countries. In particular, we tried to turn our attention to the level of “affinity” in international 
relationships which in our article is interpreted as similarity in culture, habits, politics and 
trust that are contained in the concept of psychic distance. Psychic distance can be defined as 
“The sum of factors preventing the flow of information from and to the market. These include 
difference in language, education, business practices, culture, and industrial development.” 
(Johanson and Vahlne 1977). 
                                                            
3  Japan set up organic regulations in 1999. Canada is not included in the IFOAM list of the countries that until 
2003 had fully implemented rules for organic products but was involved in the process of drafting regulations 
and set up national standards in 1999. We considered these aspects in the construction of our dataset.  
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Notwithstanding we acknowledge that further research is needed to check more accurately 
results robustness through appropriate tests and by widening the sample our article provides a 
twofold original contribution. Previous literature outlined that agreements about equivalence 
in importing procedures for organic standards can be considered as a reliable signal of affinity 
among countries enhancing international business. In this analysis we make a step forward by 
finding  that  the  existence  of  rules  for  organic  products  rather  than  equivalence  can  be 
interpreted as signal of higher affinity, leading to wider commercial exchanges. Moreover we 
find  that  among  those  countries  providing  standards  for  organic  products  and  which  are 
generally more inclined to set up bilateral trading relationships, the most intense exchanges 
are developed by those countries with “similar” certification systems.  
This is a very interesting finding provoking sound arguments for policy makers. The existence 
of organic regulations provides information about the agricultural sector, which is wider than 
the one concerning only organic products. Differences in international organic standards or 
their absence may represent the synthesis of cultural and social behaviors, which concern 
purchases and exchanges of food in the international market. Moreover, interestingly we get 
the conclusion that the issue of organic standards harmonization cannot be adequately tackled 
if it is not dealt with in the general agricultural and food markets context. Trust regarding 
organic food products is an issue that can be hardly separated from to trust in conventional 
food. This is a relevant issue we deem policy makers should consider when implementing 
policies and actions aimed at regulating both the organic and conventional food industry. 
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Appendix 1. List of the 39 countries with a fully implemented regulation until October 2003. 
European Union 
(15) 




Africa and Middle 
East (1) 
Austria  Bulgaria  Australia  Argentina  Tunisia 
Belgium  Cyprus  India  Costa Rica   
Denmark  Czech Republic  Japan  USA   
Finland  Hungary  Philippines     
France  Iceland  Korea     
Germany  Lithuania  Taiwan     
Greece  Norway  Thailand     
Ireland  Poland       
Italy  Serbia and 
Montenegro 
     
Luxembourg  Slovak Republic       
The Netherlands  Slovenia       
Portugal  Switzerland       
Spain  Turkey       
Sweden         
United Kingdom         
Source: IFOAM (2004) 
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Appendix 2. List of the 65 countries in our dataset. 
European Union 
(10) 




Africa and Middle 
East (22) 
Austria  Malta  Bahrain  Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Algeria 
Belgium  Switzerland  Bangladesh  Bahamas  Angola 
Denmark    Fiji Islands  Barbados  Burkina Faso 
Finland    Iran  Bolivia  Central African 
Republic 
France    Japan  Canada  Djibouti 
Germany    Jordan  Dominica  Gabon 
Greece    Kuwait  Dominican 
Republic 
Ghana 
Netherlands    Laos  El Salvador  Guinea 
Spain    Myanmar  Ecuador  Kenya 
United Kingdom    Oman  Panama  Mali 
    Pakistan  Paraguay  Mauritania 
    Papua New Guinea  Seychelles  Mauritius 
    Qatar  Suriname  Mozambique 
    Saudi Arabia  United  States  of 
America 
Nigeria 
    Singapore    Rwanda 
    United  Arab 
Emirates 
  Senegal 
    Yemen    Sierra Leone 
        Sudan 
        Togo 
        Uganda 
        Zambia 
        Zimbabwe 
 
 